Introduction
In this paper we employ a model for components which fail due to one of a series of "competing" failure mechanisms, each acting independently on the system. The components under consideration are repaired upon failure, but are also preventively maintained. The preventive maintenance (PM) is performed periodically with some fixed period τ , but PM can also be performed out of schedule due to casual observation of an evolving failure. The maintenance need not be perfect; we use a modified version of the imperfect repair model by Brown and Proschan 1 to allow a flexible yet simple maintenance model. Our motivation for this model is to estimate quantities which describe the "goodness" of the maintenance crew; their ability to prevent failures by performing thorough maintenance at the correct time. The data required to estimate the parameters in the model we propose are the intermediate failure times, the "winning" failure mechanism associated with each failure (i.e. the failure mechanism leading to the failure), as well as the maintenance activity. This data is found in most modern reliability data banks.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows: We start in Section with the problem definition by introducing the type of data and parameters we consider. Next, the required theoretical background is sketched in Section , followed by a complete description of the proposed model in Section . Empirical results are reported in Section , and we make some concluding remarks in Section .
Problem definition, typical data and model parameters
Consider a mechanical component which may fail at random times, and which after failure is immediately repaired and put back into service. In practice there can be several root causes for the failure, e.g. vibration, corrosion, etc. We call these causes failure mechanisms and denote them by M 1 , . . . , M k . It is assumed that each failure can be classified as the consequence of exactly one failure mechanism. The component is assumed to undergo preventive maintenance (PM), usually at fixed time periods τ > 0. In addition, the maintenance crew may perform unscheduled preventive maintenance of a component if required. The rationale for unscheduled PM is illustrated in Figure 1 : We assume that the component is continuously deteriorating when used, so that the performance gradually degrades until it falls outside a preset acceptable margin. As soon as the performance is unacceptable, we say that the component experiences a critical failure. Before the component fails it may exhibit inferior but admissible performance. This is a "signal" to the maintenance crew that a critical failure is approaching, and that the inferior component may be repaired. When the maintenance crew intervenes and repairs a component before it fails critically, we call it a degraded failure, and the repair action is called (an unscheduled) preventive maintenance. On the other hand, the repair activity performed after a critical failure is called a corrective maintenance.
The history of the component may in practice be logged as shown in 
where each point represents an event (see Figure 2 ). Here 
The data in Table 1 can thus be coded as (with M 1 = Vibration, M 2 = Corrosion), (314, 1, 0), (8446, 0, 2), (8760, 0, 2), (794, 2, 1), (1809, 0, 2) .
A complete set of data will typically involve events from several similar components. The data can then be represented as
where j is the index which labels the component. In practice there may also be observed covariates with such data. The models considered in this paper will, however, not include this possibility even though they could easily be modified to do so.
Our aim is to present a model for data of type (1) (or (3)). The basic ingredients in such a model are the hazard rates ω m (t) at time t for each failure mechanism M m , for a component which is new at time t = 0. We assume that ω m (t) is a continuous and integrable function on [0, ∞). In practice it will be important to estimate ω m (·) since this information may, e.g., be used to plan future maintenance strategies.
The most frequently used models for repairable systems assume either perfect repair (renewal process models) or minimal repair (nonhomogeneous Poisson-process models). Often none of these may be appropriate, and we shall here adopt the idea of the imperfect repair model presented by Brown and Proschan
1 . This will introduce two parameters per failure mechanism: p m = probability of perfect repair for a preventive maintenance of M m π m = probability of perfect repair for a corrective maintenance of M m .
These quantities are of interest since they can be used as indications of the quality of maintenance. The parameters may in practice be compared between plants and companies, and thereby unveil maintenance improvement potential. Finally, our model will take into account the relation between preventive and corrective maintenance. It is assumed that the component gives some kind of "signal", which will alert the maintenance crew to perform a preventive maintenance before a critical failure occurs. Thus it is not reasonable to model the (potential) times for preventive and corrective maintenance as stochastically independent. We shall therefore adopt the random signs censoring of Cooke 2 . This will eventually introduce a single new parameter q m for each failure mechanism, with interpretation as the probability that a critical failure is avoided by a preceding unscheduled preventive maintenance.
In the cases where there is a single failure mechanism, we shall drop the index m on the parameters above.
Basic ingredients of the model
In this section we describe and discuss the two main building blocks of our final model. In Section we consider the concept of imperfect repair, as defined by Brown and Proschan 1 . Then in Section we introduce our basic model for the relation between preventive and corrective maintenance. Throughout the section we assume that there is a single failure mechanism (k = 1).
Imperfect repair
Our point of departure is the imperfect repair model of Brown and Proschan 1 , which we shall denote BP in the following. Consider a single sequence of failures, occurring at successive times T 1 , T 2 , . . . As in the previous section we let the Y i be times between events, see Figure 2 . Furthermore, N (t) is the number of events in (0, t], and N (t − ) is the number of events in (0, t). For the explanation of imperfect repair models it is convenient to use the conditional intensity
where F t − is the history of the counting process 3 up to time t. This notation enables us to review some standard repair models. Let ω(t) be the hazard rate of a com-ponent of "age" t. Then perfect repair is modelled by λ (t | F t − ) = ω t − T N (t − ) which means that the age of the component at time t equals t − T N (t − ) , the time elapsed since the last event. Minimal repair is modelled by λ (t | F t − ) = ω (t), which means that the age at any time t equals the calendar time t. Imperfect repair can be modelled by λ (t | F t − ) = ω Ξ N (t − ) + t − T N (t − ) where 0 ≤ Ξ i ≤ T i is some measure of the effective age of the component immediately after the ith event, more precisely, immediately after the corresponding repair. In the BP model, Ξ i is defined indirectly by letting a failed component be given perfect repair with probability p, and minimal repair with probability 1 − p. For simplicity of notation we follow Kijima 4 and introduce random variables D i to denote the outcome of the repair immediately after the ith event. If we put D i = 0 for a perfect repair and D i = 1 for a minimal one, it follows that
The BP model with parameter p corresponds to assuming that the
BP type models have been considered by several authors, including Block et al.
5
who extended the model to allow the parameter p to be time varying, Kijima 4 who studied two general repair models for which BP is a special case, Hollander et al. 6 who studied statistical inference in the model, Dorado et al. 7 who proposed a more general model with BP as a special case, and most notably for the present work, Whitaker and Samaniego 8 whose results we discuss in further detail below. Whitaker and Samaniego 8 found non-parametric maximum likelihood estimators for (p, F ) in the BP model, where F is the distribution function corresponding to the hazard ω(·). They noted that p is in general not identifiable if only the inter-event times Y i are observed. The problem is related to the memoryless property of the exponential distribution, and is hardly a surprise. To ensure identifiability, Whitaker and Samaniego made strong assumptions about data availability, namely that the type of repair (minimal or perfect) is reported for each repair action (i.e., the variables D j are actually observed). In real applications, however, exact information on the type of repair is rarely available. As we shall see in Section , identifiability of p is still possible in the model by appropriately modelling the maintenance actions.
In order to illustrate estimation in the BP model based on the Y i alone, we consider the failure times of Plane 7914 from the air conditioner data of Proschan 9 given in Table 2 . These data were also used by Whitaker and Samaniego 8 . The joint density of the observations Y 1 , . . . , Y n can be calculated as a product of conditional densities,
For computation of the ith factor we condition on the unobserved
where Ω(x) = x 0 ω(t)dt is the cumulative hazard function and δ(j > 1) is 1 if j > 1 and 0 otherwise. The idea is to partition the set of vectors (d 1 , . . . , d i−1 ) according to the number of 1s immediately preceding the ith event.
Let the cumulative hazard be given by Ω(x) = µx α for unknown µ and α. The profile log likelihoods of the single parameter p and the pair (α, p) are shown in Figure 3a ) and Figure 3b ) respectively. The maximum likelihood estimates arê α = 1.09,μ = exp(−4.81), andp = 0.01. However, the data contain very little information about p; this is illustrated in Figure 3a) . It is seen that both p = 0, corresponding to an NHPP, and p = 1, corresponding to a Weibull renewal process are "equally" possible models here. The problem is closely connected to the problem of unidentifiability of p, noting that the maximum likelihood estimate of α is close to 1. Indeed, the exponential model with α = 1 fixed gives the maximum log likelihood −123.86 while the maximum value in the full model (including µ, α and p) is only marginally larger, −123.78. Table 2 . Figure 3a) shows the profile likelihood of p, Figure 3b) shows the (α, p)-profile likelihood.
Modelling preventive versus corrective maintenance
Recall from Section that PM interventions are basically periodic with some fixed period τ , but that unscheduled preventive maintenance may still be performed within a PM period, reported as degraded failures. Thus degraded failures may censor critical failures, and the two types of failure may be highly correlated. A number of possible ways to model interaction between degraded and critical failures are discussed by Cooke 2 . We adopt one of these, called random signs censoring. In the notation introduced in Section we consider here the case when we observe pairs (Y i , J i ) where the Y i are inter-event times whereas the J i are indicators of failure type (critical or degraded). For a typical pair (Y, J) we let Y be the minimum of the potential critical failure time X and the potential degraded failure time Z, while J = I(Z < X) is the indicator of the event {Z < X} (assuming that P (Z = X) = 0 and that there are no external events). Thus we have a competing risk problem. However, while X and Z would traditionally be treated as independent, random signs censoring makes them dependent in a special way.
The basic assumption of random signs censoring is that the event of successful preventive maintenance, {Z < X}, is stochastically independent of the potential critical failure time X. In other words, the conditional probability q(x) = P (Z < X|X = x) does not depend on the value of x.
Let X have hazard rate function ω(x) and cumulative hazard Ω(x). In addition to the assumption of random signs censoring, we will assume that conditionally, given Z < X and X = x, the distribution of the intervention time Z satisfies
To see why (5) is reasonable, consider Figure 4 . When "Nature" has chosen in favour of the crew and has selected the time to critical failure, X = x, which the crew will have to beat, she first draws a value u uniformly from [0, Ω(x)]. Then the time for preventive maintenance is chosen as Z = Ω −1 (u), where Ω −1 (·) is the inverse function of Ω(·). Following this procedure makes the conditional density of Z proportional to the intensity of the underlying failure process. This seems like a coarse but somewhat reasonable description of the behaviour of a competent maintenance crew. Our joint model for (X, Z) is thus defined from the following:
(i) X has hazard rate ω(·).
(ii) {Z < X} and X are stochastically independent.
(iii) Z given Z < X and X = x has distribution function (5).
These requirements determine the distribution of the observed pair (Y, J) as follows. First, by (ii) we get P (y ≤ Y ≤ y + dy, J = 0) = P (y ≤ X ≤ y + dy, X < Z)
where we introduce the parameter q = P (Z < X). Next,
where Ie(t) = ∞ t exp(−u)/u du is known as the exponential integral 10 .
It is now straightforward to establish the density and distribution function of Y ,
and
Note that the proposed maintenance model introduces only one new parameter, namely q. We can interpret this parameter in terms of the alertness of the maintenance crew; a large value of q corresponds to a crew that is able to prevent a large part of the critical failures.
The distribution (6) for Y is a mixture distribution, with one component representing the failure distribution one would have without preventive maintenance, and the other mixture component being the conditional density of time for PM given that PM "beats" critical failure. It is worth noticing that the distribution with density ω(y) Ie(Ω(y)) is stochastically smaller than the distribution with density ω(y) exp(−Ω(y)); this is a general consequence of random signs censoring.
General model
Recall that the events in our most general setting are either critical failures, degraded failures or external events; consider Figure 2 . We shall assume that corrective maintenance is always performed following a critical failure, while preventive maintenance is performed both after degraded failures and external events. Moreover, in the case of several failure mechanisms, any failure is treated as an external event for all failure mechanisms except the one failing.
Single failure mechanism
In this case the data for one component are (Y i , J i ); i = 1, . . . , n with J i now defined as in (2) with three possible values. Suppose for a moment that all repairs, both corrective and preventive, are perfect. Then we shall assume that the (Y i , J i ) are i.i.d. observations of (Y, J) where Y = min(X, Z, U ), (X, Z) is distributed as in Section , and U is the (potential) time of an external event. The U is assumed to be stochastically independent of (X, Z) and to have a distribution which does not depend on the parameters of our model. It follows that we can disregard the terms corresponding to U in the likelihood calculation. The likelihood contribution from an observation (Y, J) will therefore be as follows (see section ):
f (y, 2) = exp (−Ω(y)) − q Ω(y) Ie(Ω(y)) .
The last expression follows from (7) and corresponds to the case where all we know is that max(X, Z) > y.
To the model given above we now add imperfect repair. Recall that in the BP model there is a probability p of perfect repair (D i = 0) after each event. We shall here distinguish between preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance by letting D i equal 0 with probability p if the ith event is a preventive maintenance or an external event, and with probability π if the ith event is a critical failure. Moreover, we shall assume that for all i we have D 1 , . . . , D i conditionally independent given y 1 , . . . , y i , j 1 , . . . , j i .
From this we are able to write down the likelihood of the data as a product of the following conditional distributions. The derivation is a straightforward extension of the one in Section .
is a simple function of p and π. Thus, what remains to be defined are the conditional densities f ((y i , j i )|ξ i−1 ), i.e. the conditional densities of (Y i , J i ) given that the age of the component immediately after the (i − 1)th event is ξ i−1 . We shall define these to equal the conditional densities given no event in (0, ξ i−1 ), of the distribution given in (8). Thus we have
If we have data from several independent components, the complete likelihood is given as the product of the individual likelihoods.
The model for a single failure mechanism is displayed as a directed acyclic graph 11, 12 in Figure 5 . Due to the imperfect repair we do not have guaranteed renewals at each event, hence we have to use a time evolving model to capture the dynamics in the system. For clarity, only time-slice r (i.e., the time between event r − 1 and r) is shown.
Identifiability of parameters
The present discussion of identifiability is inspired by the corresponding discussion by Whitaker and Samaniego 8 , who considered the simple BP model. Refer again to the model of the previous subsection. We assume here that, conditional on (Y 1 , J 1 ), (Y 2 , J 2 ), . . . , (Y i−1 , J i−1 ), the (potential) time to the next Figure 5 : The model for a single failure mechanism, when only time-slice r is shown. The double-lined nodes represent the observable variables. Ξ r is the effective age immediately after the rth repair, Ξ r depends on Ξ r−1 together with what happens during the rth time-slice. X r is the potential time to critical failure (given the history), and Z r is the corresponding potential time to a degraded failure. Y r is the rth inter-event time, and J r = I(Z r < X r ).
external event is a random variable U with continuous distribution G and support on all of (0, τ ] where τ as before is the regular maintenance interval. Moreover, the distribution G does not depend on the parameters of the model, and it is kept fixed in the following. We also assume that ω(x) > 0 for all x > 0 and that 0 < q < 1. The parameters of the model are ω, q, p, π. These, together with G, determine a distribution of (Y 1 , J 1 ), . . . , (Y n , J n ) which we call F (ω,q,p,π) . Here n is kept fixed.
The question of identifiability can be put as follows: Suppose
which means that the two parameterizations lead to the same distribution of the observations (Y 1 , J 1 ), . . . , (Y n , J n ). Can we from this conclude that ω = ω * , q = q * , p = p * , π = π * ? First note that (9) implies that the distribution of (Y 1 , J 1 ) is the same under the two parameterizations; Y 1 = min(X, Z, U ). It is clear that each of the following two types of probabilities are the same under the two parameterizations,
By independence of (X, Z) and U , and since P (U > x) > 0 if and only if x < τ , we conclude that each of the following two types of probabilities are equal under the two parameterizations,
These probabilities can be written respectively
Thus, by integrating from 0 to x we conclude that (9) implies for x ≤ τ
We shall now see that this implies that q = q * and Ω(x) = Ω * (x) for all x ≤ τ . Suppose, for contradiction, that there is an x 0 ≤ τ such that Ω(x 0 ) < Ω * (x 0 ). Then since both 1 − exp(−t) and 1 − exp(−t) + t Ie(t) are strictly increasing in t, it follows from respectively (10) and (11) that 1 − q > 1 − q * and q > q * . But this is a contradiction. In the same manner we get a contradiction if Ω(
for all x ≤ τ ) and hence also q = q * . We shall see below that in fact we have Ω(x) = Ω * (x) on the interval (0, nτ ), but first we shall consider the identifiability of p and π. For this end we consider the joint distribution of (Y 1 , J 1 ), (Y 2 , J 2 ). In the same way as already demonstrated we can disregard U in the discussion, by independence, but we need to restrict y 1 , y 2 so that y 1 + y 2 ≤ τ . First, look at
−Ω(y2)
This is a linear function of π with coefficient of π proportional to
Using the assumption that 0 < q < 1 we thus conclude that π = π * unless (13) equals 0 for all y 1 and y 2 with y 1 +y 2 ≤ τ . Making the similar computation, putting J 2 = 1 instead of J 2 = 0 in (12), we can similarly conclude that π = π * unless
equals 0 for all y 1 and y 2 with y 1 + y 2 ≤ τ . Now, if both (13) and (14) were 0 for all y 1 and y 2 with y 1 + y 2 ≤ τ , then we would necessarily have
for all y 1 and y 2 with y 1 + y 2 ≤ τ . Since we have assumed that ω(·) is strictly positive, (15) would imply that exp(−t)/Ie(t) is constant for t in some interval (a, b). This is of course impossible by the definition of Ie(·), and it follows that not both of (13) and (14) can be identically zero. Hence π is identifiable. Identifiability of p is concluded in the same way by putting J 1 = 1 instead of J 1 = 0 in (12) .
So far we have concluded equality of the parameters q, p, π under the two parameterizations, while we have concluded that Ω(x) = Ω * (x) for all x ≤ τ . But then, putting y 1 = τ in (12), while letting y 2 run from 0 to τ , it follows that Ω(x) = Ω * (x) also for all τ < x ≤ 2τ . By continuing we can eventually conclude that Ω(x) = Ω * (x) for all 0 < x ≤ nτ . If τ = ∞, then of course the whole function ω(·) is identifiable. However, even if τ < ∞ we may have identifiability of all of ω(·). For example, suppose Ω(x) = µx α with µ, α positive parameters. Then the parameters are identifiable since (10) in this case implies that
for all x ≤ τ . This clearly implies the pairwise equality of the parameters.
Several failure mechanisms
We now look at how to extend the model of Section to k > 1 failure mechanisms and data given as in (1) or (3). Our basic assumption is that the different failure mechanisms M 1 , . . . , M k act independently on the component. More precisely we let the complete likelihood for the data be given as the product of the likelihoods for each failure mechanism. Note that the set of events is the same for all failure mechanisms, and that failure due to one failure mechanism is treated as an external event for the other failure mechanisms.
The above assumption implies a kind of independence of the maintenance for each failure mechanism. Essentially we assume that the pairs (X, Z) are independent across failure mechanisms. This is appropriate if there are different maintenance crews connected to each failure mechanisms, or could otherwise mean that the "signals" of degradation emitted from the component are independent across failure mechanisms.
Another way of interpreting our assumption is that, conditional on
the next vector (Y i , K i , J i ) corresponds to a competing risk situation involving m independent risks, one for each failure mechanism, and each with properties as for the model given in Section . The parameters (ω, q, p, π) may (and will) in general depend on the failure mechanism. As regards identifiability of parameters, this will follow from the results for single failure mechanisms of Section by the assumed independence of failure mechanisms.
If we have data from several independent components of the same kind, given as in (3), then the complete likelihood is given as the product of the likelihoods for each component. 
Parameter estimation

Calculation scheme
The complete model as described in Section involves some important conditional independence properties that both special purpose maximum-likelihood estimator algorithms as well as Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations can benefit from. In this section we have used maximum likelihood methods.
A case study
To exemplify the merits of the proposed model, we use Phase IV of the Gas Turbine dataset from the Offshore Reliability Database 13 . Only the Gas Generator subsystem is included in the study. We analyse data from a single offshore installation to ensure maximum homogeneity of the data sample. The dataset consists of 23 mechanical components, which are followed over a total of 603.690 operating hours. Table 5 : Estimated MTTFF in our model and the "observed failure rate" model.
The PM history for the gas turbines consists of 78 PM events. The PM intervals ("τ ") for the different components vary between 8 and 12 calendar months.
Results
The data can be put on the form (3) so the complete likelihood can be calculated as described in Section . Having a small number of critical failures, the estimates of π 1 , . . . , π 4 will not be reliable; the number of critical failures is simply too small. To reduce the number of parameters we introduce κ > 0 defined so that π m = p κ m for m = 1, . . . , 4. Here κ indicates the difference between the effect of preventive and corrective maintenance. A small value of κ means that corrective maintenance is much more beneficial than the preventive, and a value close to 1 judges the two maintenance operations about equal. In the same way, we assume that q 1 = · · · = q 4 , and use q to denote these variables.
We also use a simple parametric forms of the ω i (·), namely the constant hazards ω i (t) = µ i , i = 1, . . . , 4. The results of maximum likelihood estimation are presented in Table 4 . The estimated value of q isq = .4, whileκ = 1 · 10 −2 . The latter value indicates that corrective maintenance actions are highly effective.
It is also interesting to calculate the mean time to first failure (M T T F F ) had there been no maintenance. This value, which we name M T T F F Naked , shows the nature of the underlying failure process unbiased by the maintenance regime; it can be estimated directly by 1/μ i in the present setting. In Table 5 we compare M T T F F Naked to the "observed failure rate" estimators given by M T T F F OFR = #Total Operating Time #Critical Failures to see the effect of including maintenance in the model. It is worth noticing that the OFR-estimates are inclined to be more optimistic than the estimators from our model. This is because degraded failures tend to censor potential critical failures, and this influences the OFR-estimate.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a simple but flexible model for maintained components which are subject to a variety of failure mechanisms. The proposed model has the standard models of perfect and minimal repair as special cases. Moreover, some of the parameters we estimate (namely p m , π m and q m ) can be used to examine the sufficiency of these smaller models. "Small" values ofq m accompanied by "extreme" values of allp m andπ m (either "close" to one or zero) indicate that reduced models are detailed enough to capture the main effects in the data. Making specific model assumptions regarding the preventive maintenance we are able to prove identifiability of all parameters.
We note that many models simpler than ours may be useful if explicit notion of maintenance quality is considered unimportant 14, 15, 16 . In our experience, the model of Lawless and Thiagarajah 17 ,
where α, β and γ are unknown parameters, and g 1 and g 2 are known functions, offers good predictive ability in the setting corresponding to Section . Observe that the conditional intensity in (16) depends both on the age t and the time since last failure t − T N (t − ) ; hence it can be considered to be an imperfect repair model with perfect and minimal repair as special cases. However, the model is difficult to interpret with respect to the physical meaning of the parameters, and is therefore not satisfactory in our more general setting. Our motivation has been to build a model that could be used to estimate the effect of maintenance, where "effect" has been connected to the model parameters q m , p m and π m . Here q m is indicative of the crew's eagerness, their ability to perform maintenance at the correct times to try to stop evolving failures. The p m and π m indicate the crew's thoroughness; their ability to actually stop the failure development. The proposed model indirectly estimates the naked failure rate, and on a specific case using real life data these estimates are significantly different from those found by "traditional" models. We make modest demands regarding data availability: Only the inter-failure times and the failure mechanisms leading to the failure accompanied by the preventive maintenance program are required. This information is available in most modern reliability data banks.
